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NOTE
PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL ACTION AS
"CONCERTED ACTIVITY" UNDER THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS ACT
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) I guarantees
employees2 the right "to engage in ... concerted activities for the pur-
pose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection."'3 Such
concerted activity is "protected activity."14 Action of an employer that
interferes with or restrains this protected activity constitutes an "unfair
labor practice"5 and empowers the National Labor Relations Board
1 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976). Section 7 contains the Act's statement of the right of
employees to act in concert:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own chobsing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refraifi
from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be
affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976) (emphasis added).
2 "Employee," as defined by the Act, includes:
any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular em-
ployer, unless this subchapter explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any
individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with,
.. .any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and
who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent
employment.
29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976). Individuals subject to exclusions are those employed as agricul-
tural laborers, domestic servants, independent contractors, supervisors, persons employed by a
spouse or parent, or persons employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act. Id
Furthermore, when two workers, only one of whom is an "employee" under the Act,
engage in an activity, their activity is not concerted and, therefore, not protected. See Capital
Times Co., 234 N.L.R.B. 309, 309-10 (1978) (no concerted activity when individual employee
refused to cross picket line set up by union members who were not employees within NLRA's
meaning).
3 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). Under § 7, "mutual aid or protection" includes, but is not
limited to, "collective bargaining." See Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. NLRB, 358 F.2d 411, 413
(9th Cir. 1966) (when employee had complained of working. cpnditions, court rejects em-
ployer's argument that activities for "mutual aid or protection" must be related to "collective
bargaining" activity). See generally infra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
4 The significance of finding an activity to be protected by § 7 is twofold. See infra notes
9-21 and accompanying text. If an employee's activity is protected, employer interference
with it constitutes an unfair labor practice. See infra notes 5-6, 17-20 and accompanying text.
If the activity is unprotected, however, the employee is subject to the common law rule that
his employer may discharge him for any reason. See infra note 14 and accompanying text.
5 Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA provides that "[iut shall be an unfair labor practice for
an employer. . . to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 157." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976).
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(NLRB) to act against the employer.6 Although Congress's use of the
term "concerted activities" seemingly requires that activities involve at
least two employees to gain NLRA protection, 7 the NLRB and the
courts have extended section 7 protection to actions of individual em-
ployees in certain circumstances.
This Note examines the fiction of individual concerted activity8 to
determine the extent to which protection of individual action is a judi-
cial distortion, rather than a necessary extension of section 7. Examina-
6 Section 10(a) of the NLRA provides in part: "The Board is empowered. . . to pre-
vent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in section 158 of this title)
affecting commerce." 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976). Section 10(c) empowers the Board, if it finds
an unfair labor practice, to require: (1) cessation of the practice, (2) "affirmative action in-
cluding reinstatement of employees with or without back pay," and (3) posting of appropriate
notices in the work place that disavow the previous unfair labor practice. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(c) (1976); see also NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 13 (1962) (rein-
statement of seven employees who had staged a walkout because of working conditions). For
an excellent examination of how violations of§ 7 rights are "prevented, redressed, or compen-
sated," see D. MCDOWELL & K. HUHN, NLRB REMEDIES FOR UNFAIR LABOR PRAcTIcES 3
(1976).
Section 10(e) gives the Board the right to petition the circuit court, within whose juris-
diction the alleged unfair labor practice occurred, for the enforcement of a Board order. 29
U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976). Section 10() gives any person aggrieved by a Board order a similar
right to petition a circuit court for review of that order. 29 U.S.C. § 160(0 (1976).
7 "Concert" requires the involvement of at least two people. See City Disposal Sys. v.
NLRB, 683 F.2d 1005 (6th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) ("An individual does not act in concert
with himself."); Ontario Knife Co. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 840, 844 (2d Cir. 1980) ("[B]y defini-
tion, an individual acting alone cannot act in concert."); Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp. v.
NLRB, 635 F.2d 304, 306 (4th Cir. 1980) (" 'Concerted activity,' under the statute, read
literally, would appear to require more than a single participant.") (citing with approval the
Northern Metal court's use of dictionary definition of "concert"); NLRB v. Northern Metal
Co., 440 F.2d 881, 884 (3d Cir. 1971) ("Webster's New International Dictionary. . . defines
'concert' as 'agreement in a design or plan; union formed by mutual communication of opin-
ions and views; accordance in a scheme; harmony; simultaneous action' and 'concerted' as
'mutually contrived or planned; agreed on.' "); cf. infa note 75 and accompanying text (indi-
vidual action aimed at inducing group action is protected concerted activity).
8 The term "individual concerted activity" most precisely describes the issue in ques-
tion. "[P]resumed 'concerted activity' " relates specifically to the NLRB standard for finding
a presumption of concerted activity in an individual employee's actions. Krispy Kreme Dough-
nut Corp., 635 F.2d at 309; see infia notes 84-89 and accompanying text. "Constructive con-
certed activity" refers only to one formulation of individual concerted action-the Interboro
doctrine. Note, Constructive Concerted Activity and Individual Rights. The Northern Metal-In-
terboro Split, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 152, 158 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Note, Constructive Con-
cerled Activity]; see inyfa notes 67-76 and accompanying text.
The fiction of individual concerted activity, see infia note 94, has gained such acceptance
as to render "concerted activities" only "a term of art rather than a factual description."
Anchortank, Inc. v. NLRB, 618 F.2d 1153, 1160 (5th Cir. 1980) ("[T]he determination
whether a single employee's action is protected by section 7 turns on the 'interpretation of the
purpose and effect of such action and not upon the simple and more limited question of
whether there was, in fact, action "in concert" '.")"(quoting Note, Constructive ConcertedActivity,
supra at 154 (footnote omitted)); cf. Note, The Requirement of"Concerted"Action Under the NLRA,
53 COLUM. L. REV. 514, 517, 520 (1953) (Prior discussion, agreement, or subjective accord
are not necessary to find "concerted activity"; rather, "any activity by an employee . . .
which [objectively] has the tendency of furthering the interests. . . of. . . employees, will be
found to be 'conceried.'") [hereinafter cited as Note, "Concerted" Action].
CONCERTED ACTIVITY
tion of the standards and rationales that courts and the NLRB have
used and of the policies underlying the NLRA reveals, in fact, that indi-
vidual concerted activity is an unwarranted expansion of section 7
protection.
I
PROTECTED STATUS UNDER SECTION 7
Section 7 protects employees engaged in concerted activity in a
wide variety of circumstances. It protects, for instance, nonunionized
employees engaged in such activity9 and, in some instances, protects un-
ionized employees acting outside established grievance procedures.' 0
Section 7 even protects concerted conduct by employees who contem-
plate neither union activity nor collective bargaining. 1 A protected
grievance or complaint also retains its protected status even when whol-
ly or partly inaccurate, if the employees present it in good faith.' 2 Fur-
9 Se Ontario Knife Co. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 840, 843 (2d Cir. 1980) ("long settled prin-
ciple that § 7 covers concerted activities by nonunionized employees for the purpose of mu-
tual aid or protection") (citing NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962));
NLRB v. Columbia Univ., 541 F.2d 922, 931 (2d Cir. 1976) ("IT]he protection afforded to
concerted activities under the NLRA applies equally to workers in unionized or in non-union-
ized firms.'); Joanna Cotton Mills Co. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 749, 752 (4th Cir. 1949)
C" '[C]oncerted activities'. . . are not limited to cases where the employees are acting through
unions or are otherwise formally organized."); NLRB v. Schwartz, 146 F.2d 773, 774 (5th Cir.
1945) ("IT]he right of employees lawfully to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of
mutual aid, outside of a union, is specified by the Act.').
10 See Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n v. NLRB, 206 F.2d 325, 328 (9th Cir. 1953)
(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976): "[A]ny individual employee or a group of employees
shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer and to have such
grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining representative. . . '"). But
see Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 544 F.2d 320, 326 (7th Cir. 1976) ("The Act does not
tender protection to activity by employees, albeit concerted, which abandons the principles of
exclusive representation by circumventing established grievance procedures, and attempts in-
stead to bargain with the employer regarding working conditions on separate terms."); inha
note 129.
11 See, e.g., NLRB v. Modem Carpet Indus., 611 F.2d 811,813 (10th Cir. 1979) (employ-
ees' refusal to work with hazardous material until given assurance of safety held concerted
activity for mutual aid or protection); NLRB v. Okla-Inn, 488 F.2d 498, 502 (10th Cir. 1973)
(Section 7 of the NLRA "protects concerted activity. . . to alleviate oppressive working con-
ditions, regardless of whether [the] activity is channeled through a union, through collective
bargaining, or through some other means.'); Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. NLRB, 358 F.2d 411,
413 (9th Cir. 1966) (rejecting company's argument that "activities for 'other mutual aid or
protection' must be related to 'the purpose of collective bargaining'").
12 See NLRB v. Modem Carpet Indus., 611 F.2d 811,814 (10th Cir. 1979) (question was
"whether or not the employees in good faith believed that working with the radioactive lead
was dangerous"); Walls Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 753, 754 (D.C. Cir.)
("[N]otwithstanding the inaccuracy of any allegation, the [employees'] activity was protected
conduct within the meaning of section 7. . .. "), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 923 (1963); cf. Owens-
Coming Fiberglas Corp. v. NLRB, 407 F.2d 1357, 1365 (4th Cir. 1969) ("[P]romulgation of
deliberately or maliciously false information is not protected."); Socony Mobil Oil Co. v.
NLRB, 357 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1966) (union's complaint, although partially erroneous, not
made maliciously).
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thermore, section 7 protects concerted activity even if the employees fail
to present their grievance to their employer before they act. 13
An employer may discharge or otherwise penalize an employee for
any reason or for no reason at all if the employer is not motivated by the
employee's participation in a protected activity.' 4 Thus, it is necessary
to determine an employer's subjective motivation for any interference
with protected activity.15 The mere existence of an objective cause for
discharge will not legitimate an employer's conduct1 6 when the actual
motivation underlying employer interference with protected activity is
opposition to the activity;1 7 thus violation of the NLRA occurs whether
protected activity motivates the interference wholly, or only partially.18
Even an employer's good faith belief that an employee is engaged in
unprotected conduct does not validate employer action if the conduct is
13 See NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14 (1962) (employees do not
necessarily lose § 7 protection "merely because they do not present a specific demand upon
their employer to remedy a condition they find objectionable"); NLRB v. Empire Gas, Inc.,
566 F.2d 681, 684 (10th Cir. 1977) (no loss of§ 7 protection when employee does not present
grievance to employer before attempting to organize a work stoppage).
14 We must not forget that the National Labor Relations Act "does not interfere
with the normal exercise of the right of the employer to select its employees or
to discharge them"; that the employer "may not, under cover of that right,
intimidate or coerce its employees with respect to their self-organization and
representation, and, on the other hand, the Board is not entitled to make its
authority a pretext for interfering with the right of discharge when that right
is exercised for other reasons than such intimidation and coercion."
Joanna Cotton Mills Co. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 749, 753 (4th Cir. 1949) (quoting NLRB v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45-46 (1937)); see also Cloke, Concerted Activity and the
National Labor Poliq, 5 SAN FERN. V.L. REv. 289, 299 (1976).
15 Existence of objective cause will not suffice because subjective motivation is the crite-
rion. Therefore, courts must determine whether an employer's action might have been less
harsh had there been no protected employee activity. See Keokuk Gas Serv. Co. v. NLRB,
580 F.2d 328, 335 (8th Cir. 1978) (unfair labor practice where employee "would have re-
ceived milder punishment but for his threat to file a grievance"); Neptune Water Meter Co. v.
NLRB, 551 F.2d 568, 570 (4th Cir. 1977) (discharged employee would have received "milder
form of punishment" but for union activity).
16 See Southwest Latex Corp. v. NLRB, 426 F.2d 50, 56 (5th Cir. 1970) (evidence must
show "causal connections between [the employee's] activity and the discharge"); NLRB v.
Century Broadcasting Corp., 419 F.2d 771, 777 (8th Cir. 1969) (discharge may be discrimina-
tory only when employer had knowledge of employee's union activity and this knowledge
motivated discharge); infra note 39. The NLRB general counsel has the burden of proving
that an employer's motivation for discharge was improper. See Jim Causley Pontiac v.
NLRB, 620 F.2d 122, 126 (6th Cir. 1980).
17 "It is well established that [§ 7] is violated when the subjective motivation underlying
a discharge is that of opposition to an employee's union activity." Randolph Div., Ethan
Allen, Inc. v. NLRB, 513 F.2d 706, 707 (1st Cir. 1975) (citing Radio Officers' Union v.
NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 42-44 (1954); NLRB v. Barberton Plastics Prods., Inc., 354 F.2d 66, 68
(6th Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Whitin Mach. Works, 204 F.2d 883, 885 (1st Cir. 1953)).
18 A discharge only partially motivated by protected activity violates § 8(a)(1). NLRB
v. Elias Bros. Restaurants, Inc., 496 F.2d 1165, 1167 (6th Cir. 1974); accord Jim Causley Pon-
tiac v. NLRB, 620 F.2d 122, 126 (6th Cir. 1980) (discharge motivated, in part, by employee's
"low productivity," and in part by employee's protected activity; court finds unfair labor
practice because employer knew the activity was concerted).
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in fact protected.' 9 Moreover, a close proximity in time between pro-
tected activity and employer action creates an inference that the pro-
tected activity motivated such action.20
In short, a court will extend significant protection to concerted ac-
tivities within the ambit of section 7. The courts, however, have en-
countered difficulty in interpreting and applying the requirements for
protection as stated in section 7.21 Although the NLRB and courts often
construe the "concerted activity" and "mutual aid" requirements as sy-
nonymous,22 in fact, they are distinct and independent. 23
A. Mutual Aid or Protection
Section 7 does not protect all concerted activities, 24 but only that
19 See NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21,23 (1964); NLRB v. Knuth Bros., 537
F.2d 950, 954 (7th Cir. 1976) (employer's good faith belief that employee was disloyal because
employee failed to use care in using information acquired in the course of employment did
not absolve employer from § 7 violation). If the activity is not protected, however, the activ-
ity constitutes "cause" for discharge under § 10(c) and employer action does not violate § 7.
See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976); infra note 24.
20 See Jim Causley Pontiac v. NLRB, 620 F.2d 122, 126 (6th Cir. 1980) (immediacy of
employee's discharge after employer learned of filing of safety complaint supports inference of
unfair labor practice); NLRB v. Tennessee Packers, Inc., 390 F.2d 782, 784 (6th Cir. 1968)
('[P]roximity between. . . activity protected. . . and measures taken against employees...
can lend support to [an] inference of unfair labor practice.').
21 See, e.g., NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 262 (1975).
22 See in/ra notes 79-81, 134-36 and accompanying text.
23 See infra note 25 and accompanying text. In Ontario Knife Co. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d
840, 844-45 (2d Cir. 1980), the Second Circuit observed that "the issue ...was not the
requirement of concertedness, but the requirement that the activities be for 'mutual aid or
protection.' . Not only must the ultimate objective be 'mutual' but the activity must be
'concerted'. . .. " For example, an individual employee's activity might be concerted but
unprotected if it is not engaged in for "mutual aid and protection." See, e.g., NLRB v. Supe-
rior Tool & Die Co., 309 F.2d 692, 695 (6th Cir. 1962) (concerted activity held unprotected
because verbal abuse and threats directed against nonstriking employees could not be deemed
for "mutual aid and protection"). The "concerted" requirement must be distinguished from
the "mutual aid" requirement. For an examination of the danger inherent in treating the two
requirements as one, see infra notes 134-36, 144-47 and accompanying text.
24 The NLRA affords no protection to some activities, whether or not they are con-
certed."See generalty Note, Constructive Concerted Activity, supra note 8, at 154 n.7; Note, The Sixth
Circuit Siurns Interboro and the Doctrine of Constructive Concerted Activit--Aro, Inc. v. NLRB
Leaves Non-Union Employees At the Mery of Their Bosses, 11 U. TOL. L. REv. 1045, 1052 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Sixth Circuit Spurns Interboro]; Note, Concerted Activity Under Section 7 of the
National Labor Relations Act, 1955 U. ILL. L.F. 129, 132-36 [hereinafter cited as Concerted Activ-
ity]. Activities in breach of a collective bargaining agreement or contract are unprotected, see,
e.g., NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332, 345 (1939), as are unlawful, violent, or in-
subordinate activities, see, e.g., NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 17 (1962);
Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942) (unlawful "mutiny"); NLRB v. Fansteel
Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 255-56 (1939) (violent "sit-down strike'); NLRB v.
Barberton Plastics Prods., 354 F.2d 66 (6th Cir. 1965) (insubordination). Nor does the Act
protect disloyalty unnecessary to carry on a worker's legitimate concerted activities, NLRB v.
Local Union No. 1229, 346 U.S. 464, 472 (1953), nor conduct in "reckless disregard of [an]
employer's business interests," NLRB v. Knuth Bros., Inc., 537 F.2d 950, 956 (7th Cir. 1976)
(employee discharged for revealing employer's confidential information). Section 10(c) of the
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concerted activity which is for the "mutual aid or protection" of em-
ployees. 25 Courts have construed "mutual aid or protection" so broadly
that employee action invariably satisfies this requirement. Activity con-
sidered to be "for mutual aid" includes "almost any activity that some-
how affects the well-being of the employees as a group. ' 26 For example,
activities directed at a dispute over terms or conditions of employment
that are pursued on behalf of all employees satisfy the "mutual aid"
requirement. 27 The Supreme Court set out the most sensible interpreta-
tion of "mutual aid" in NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc.: 28 the "solidarity" 29
established when an employee's activity gives "assurance to other em-
ployees in the bargaining unit that they, too, can obtain . . .aid and
protection"30 in like circumstances is " 'mutual aid' in the most literal
sense."
3 1
NLRA recognizes an employer's right to protect its business interests and to discharge em-
ployees "for cause." 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976). The "condonation" doctrine, however, pro-
tects employees' activities when their employer voluntarily forgives them. See, e.g.,
Richardson Paint Co. v. NLRB, 574 F.2d 1195, 1202-03 (5th Cir. 1978) (unprotected walkout
in violation of no-strike clause, subsequently condoned by employer, held protected).
25 "The words 'concerted activities' are limited in meaning by the words with which
they are associated. . . 'for the purpose of collective-bargaining or other mutual aid or pro-
tection.'" Joanna Cotton Mills Co. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 749, 752 (4th Cir. 1949). The "mu-
tual aid" requirement is important because certain concerted activities have unprotected
objectives and, therefore, are denied protection. See supra note 24.
26 Note, Constructive ConcertedActivt'ies, supra note 8, at 161; see, e.g., Frank Briscoe, Inc. v.
NLRB, 637 F.2d 946, 950 (3d Cir. 1981) (filing of EEOC complaint, .seeking to end em-
ployer's alleged discriminatory practices, was activity for mutual aid or protection); Eastex,
Inc., 215 N.L.R.B. 271, 274 (1974) (distribution of union newsletter urging employees to sup-
port union held "mutual aid or protection"), enforced, 550 F.2d 198 (5th Cir. 1977), afd, 437
U.S. 556 (1978).
The term was not construed so broadly early in NLRA history. See Note, Concerted Activ-
ity, supra note 24, at 132-35. Courts in some circumstances will give the requirement greater
scrutiny. See, e.g., NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 260 (1975);see infra notes 28-31
and accompanying text.
27 See, e.g., NLRB v. Okla-Inn, 488 F.2d 498, 502 (10th Cir. 1973) (maid's complaints
that work requirements were too harsh held protected); Hagopian & Sons, Inc. v. NLRB, 395
F.2d 947, 952 (6th Cir. 1968) (employees' complaints concerning work scheduling held pro-
tected). One commentator argues for the extension of § 7 "protection of concerted activity
for mutual aid or protection to the acts of individual employees, organized or unorganized,
when those acts are directed at terms or conditions of employment." Note, Individual Rightsfor
Organized and Unorganized Employees Under the National Labor Relations Act, 58 TEx. L. REv. 991,
1014 (1980). Under this argument, "a complaint relating to terms or conditions of employ-
ment deserves protection even when no other employees have knowledge of the activity or
actually encourage it, and even when the actor's motivation was self-interest." Id The au-
thor seemingly adopts the NLRB "benefit" standard, which conditions protection of individ-
ual activity upon a finding of "mutual aid or protection" and effectively excises from § 7 its
"concert" requirement. See infia notes 84-89, 93-139 and accompanying text.
28 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
29 Id at 261 (quoting NLRB v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., 130 F.2d 503,
506 (2d Cir. 1942)); cf. Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n v. NLRB, 206 F.2d 325, 328 (9th
Cir. 1953) (individual employee's activity to obtain "solidarity" among the employees was for
purpose of mutual aid or protection).
30 420 U.S. at 261.
31 Ad (quoting Peter Cailler Kohler, 130 F.2d at 506). The Weingarten Court also stated:
CONCERTED ACTIVITY
"Individual griping and complaining" 32 to redress a personal griev-
ance is the most notable type of behavior that fails to satisfy the "mutual
aid" requirement. 33 An employee's complaints made solely on his own
behalf, such as demands for special treatment,34 attempts to gain more
favorable contract terms for himself,35 or complaints about his personal
share of overtime work,36 are not made to achieve mutual aid and there-
fore do not merit section 7 protection. Significantly, such behavior is
individual, not concerted, activity, and therefore also fails to satisfy the
"concerted activity" requirement.37 Courts in "individual griping and
complaining" cases have denied section 7 protection because of both a
lack of mutual aid and a lack of concert, or solely because of a lack of
concert. 38 This duality and confusion of rationales may arise because a
lack of concert strongly suggests that the activity in question is not pur-
sued for employees' mutual aid. The presence or absence of concerted
The action of an employee in seeking to have the assistance of his union repre-
sentative at a confrontation with his employer clearly falls within the literal
wording of § 7. . . . This is true even though the employee alone may have
an immediate stake in the outcome; he seeks "aid or protection" against a
perceived threat to his employment security. The union representative whose
participation he seeks is, however, safeguarding not ony the particular emp/loee's
interest, but also the interests of the entire bargaining unit by exercising vigilance to
make certain that the employer does not initiate or continue a practice of
imposing punishment unjustly.
420 U.S. at 260-61 (citations and footnote omitted) (emphasis added); see Ontario Knife Co.
v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 840, 844 (2d Cir. 1980).
32 NLRB v. Buddies Supermarkets, Inc., 481 F.2d 714, 718-19 (5th Cir. 1973) (no pro-
tection where individual employee griped and complained, sought more favorable commis-
sion rate for himself, had never been designated as spokesman for other employees, and did
not speak with employer on other employees' behalf). The Buddies Supermarkets court placed
"primary reliance" on the Mushroom case, see infia notes 56-66 and accompanying text, "line of
authority." Id at 718 (footnote omitted); see Scooba Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 694 F.2d 82, 84 (5th
Cir. 1982) (per curiam) ("Purely personal disputes are not within the protection of the Act.");
Southwest Latex Corp. v. NLRB, 426 F.2d 50, 56 n.3 (5th Cir. 1970) (holding individual
griping and complaining not protected concerted activity); Hugh H. Wilson Corp. v. NLRB,
414 F.2d 1345, 1348 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 935 (1970); Indiana Gear Works v.
NLRB, 371 F.2d 273, 276 (7th Cir. 1967).
33 See infra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
34 See, e.g., Bay-Wood Indus. v. NLRB, 666 F.2d 1011 (6th Cir. 1981) (no concerted
activity when employee acted alone and on his own behalf in refusing to work unless special
equipment installed); NLRB v. Gibbs Corp., 284 F.2d 403, 405-06 (5th Cir. 1960) (shop stew-
ard discharged because of continued demands for special treatment).
35 See, e.g., NLRB v. Buddies Supermarkets, Inc., 481 F.2d 714, 717 (5th Cir. 1973);
Inked Ribbon Corp., 241 N.L.R.B. 7 (1979) (no concerted activity where individual employee
claimed wage increase and other benefits for herself only).
36 See, e.g., Pelton Casteel, Inc. v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 23, 28 (7th Cir. 1980) (employee's
complaints about job rates and overtime constituted unprotected personal griping, not "con-
certed activity").
37 See supra note 7; infra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
38 See, e.g., Indiana Gear Works v. NLRB, 371 F.2d 273, 276-77 (7th Cir. 1967) (both
lack of concert and lack of mutual aid); NLRB v. Office Towel Supply Co., 201 F.2d 838, 841
(2d Cir. 1952) (lack of concert; individual "employee's complaint, if addressed to other em-
ployees, is not, without more, 'the sort of activity which Congress intended [the NLRB] to
protect' ').
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activity, therefore, serves as a cogent indication of the existence of a pur-
pose to achieve mutual aid.3 9
B. Concerted Activities
When viewed against its statutory background, 40 section 7's "con-
certed activities" appears to be a shorthand expression for employee
group action.4 ' Congress found that the great disparity in bargaining
power between employer and employee necessitated that employees
have rights of organization and collective bargaining, and that the de-
nial of these rights caused unsettled labor relations and industrial strife
39 For example, an individual's purpose of motivating a group of employees to action
indicates that the individual's action is more than mere griping. See infra notes 55-58 and
accompanying text. ,
Some courts require proof that an employer knew of the concerted activity. For exam-
ple, the Fifth Circuit, in Southwest Latex Corp. v. NLRB, 426 F.2d 50 (5th Cir. 1970), found
a discharged employee's conduct unprotected: "assuming that [the employee's] self appoint-
ment as letter-writer amounts to concerted activity, there is no evidence in the record to show
that management or supervisory personnel knew he had so constituted himself, and therefore
no evidence to show the requisite causal connection between such activity and the discharge."
Id at 56; see also McLean Trucking Co. v. NLRB, 689 F.2d 605 (6th Cir. 1982) ("[I]t is the
employer's knowledge of an employee's concerted activity and subsequent discipline which
constitutes a violation of the Act.") (citing Jim Causley Pontiac v. NLRB, 675 F.2d 125 (6th
Cir. 1982)); Tri-State Truck Serv. v. NLRB, 616 F.2d 65, 71 (3d Cir. 1980) (employer "must
have knowledge, or reason to know, that the employee activities have coalesced into group
action for mutual aid or protection'); NLRB v. Buddies Supermarkets, Inc., 481 F.2d 714,
717 (5th Cir. 1973) (record must show employer's knowledge of concerted activity); Texas
Aluminum Co. v. NLRB, 435 F.2d 917, 919 (5th Cir. 1970) (employer's knowledge of con-
certed activity required, but may be inferred from the circumstances); Indiana Gear Works v.
NLRB, 371 F.2d 273, 276-77 (7th Cir. 1967) (although employee's activity was potentially
concerted activity, employer had no knowledge, and therefore no protection accorded to the
activity); see supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
40 Virtually no legislative history exists to clarify Congress's intent in including "con-
certed activities" in § 7. See Note, "Concerted" Action, supra note 8, at 515-16; Note, Constructive
Concerted Activity, supra note 8, at 174; Note, Sixth Circuit Spurns Interboro, supra note 24, at
1051. However, the phrase does have a statutory history predating the NLRA. Id; see also
Lynd, Right to Engage in Concerted Activity After Union Recognition: A Study of Legislative History, 50
IND. LJ. 720, 726-34 (1975). The Clayton Act of 1914 protected employees, acting "singly or
in concert," from injunctions prohibiting strikes. Ch. 323, § 20, 38 Stat. 738 (1914) (codified
at 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1976)). The Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (codified at
29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976)), extended the protection by declaring that the public policy of
the United States dictated that employees "be free from the interference, restraint, or coer-
cion of employers. . . in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1976). Section
7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 198 (1938), as well as § 7 of the
NLRA, transformed this public policy into a positive protection of concerted employee action
from employer retaliation.
41 Two commentators suggest that § 7's "concerted activities" provision may be the re-
sult of either Congress's determination that individual conduct is too insignificant to merit
governmental protection or Congress's attempt to induce workers to combine in expressing
their grievances. See Note, "Concerted" Action, supra note 8, at 522, 530; Note, Constructive Con-
certedActivity, supra note 8, at 174. These reasons seem plausible, given the necessity of screen-
ing out "individual griping and complaining," see supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text,
and the overall purpose of the NLRA, see injra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
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affecting commerce.42 The NLRA is Congress's attempt to guarantee
these necessary rights.43 Section 7 envisions concerted activity as the
means of achieving equality in bargaining power between employer and
employee and of obtaining collective benefit for employees. 44
Section 7 protects the rights of individuals to engage in specific or-
ganizational and collective bargaining activities. 45 By their very nature,
these activities involve more than one employee: they are group activi-
ties benefiting all employees. The statutory language reveals a critical
connection between these activities and the "concerted activities" re-
quirement: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities .... -46 Congress's use of "other" strongly implies that "other
concerted activities" were to possess the same group-oriented character-
istics as the specified organizational and collective bargaining activities.
II
THE STANDARDS OF INDIVIDUAL CONCERTED ACTIVITY
Each of the twelve federal circuits has accepted the concept of indi-
vidual concerted activity: in certain circumstances, individual conduct
shall be protected as concerted activity.47 The courts and the NLRB
42 See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976) (NLRA's statement of findings and declaration of policy).
43 As the Court noted in Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Or-
ganization, § 7 guarantees employees' basic rights of industrial self-organiza-
tion, rights which are for the most part 'collective rights ... to act in concert
with one's fellow employees.' . . . Section 7 protects those rights that are es-
sential to employee self-organization ...
NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 273 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting) (citation omit-
ted) (quoting Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420
U.S. 50, 62 (1975)); see also Joanna Cotton Mills Co. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 749, 752 (4th Cir.
1949) 0" 'The purpose of the act was not to guarantee to employees the right to do as they
please but to guarantee to them the right of collective bargaining for the purpose of preserv-
ing industrial peace.' ") (quoting NLRB v. Draper Corp., 145 F.2d 199, 203 (4th Cir. 1944)).
44 See NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14 (1961); Signal Oil & Gas Co.
v. NLRB, 390 F.2d 338, 343 (9th Cir. 1968) ("The Act was designed primarily to guarantee
employees the right to organize and to engage in joint action calculated to further their mu-
tual interests. . . '2); NLRB v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., 130 F.2d 503, 506
(2d Cir. 1942) ("by extending the number of those who will make the enemy of one the
enemy of all, the power of each is vastly increased"); see also Lynd, supra note 40, at 725-27.
45 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976); see supra note 1.
46 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976) (emphasis added).
47 See Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp. v. NLRB, 635 F.2d 304, 306 (4th Cir. 1980) ("ac-
tion by a single employee may be treated as 'concerted activity,' even though participated in
by a single employee'); Kohls v. NLRB, 629 F.2d 173, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (recognizing but
expressing "serious doubts about the validity of" the individual concerted activity doctrine),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 931 (1981); Pelton Casteel, Inc. v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 23, 28 (7th Cir. 1980)
("[A]ctions of an individual employee who acts on his own to enlist the support of other
employees for the purpose of mutual aid or protection are as 'concerted' as group activities to
the same end.'); Anchortank, Inc. v. NLRB, 618 F.2d 1153, 1160 (5th Cir. 1980) ("The mere
fact that an employee has acted alone does not preclude treatment of his action as concerted
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have developed four standards of varying permissiveness to identify the
circumstances necessary to support a finding of individual concerted
activity.
A. The "Representation" Standard
When an individual's conduct is "on behalf of, or as a representa-
tive of,"' 48 other employees, all courts will protect it as concerted activ-
ity.49 Although the individual need not be formally elected or
appointed,50 he must represent the expressed interests of a discrete
group of employees that has formulated complaints or grievances. 51 A
activity for mutual aid or protection under section 7."); Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v.
NLRB, 618 F.2d 1009, 1017 (3d Cir. 1980) (two employees' refusals to operate crane deemed
concerted where employees act as "spokesmen for the safety of all the employees"), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1078 (1981); NLRB v. Empire Gas, Inc., 566 F.2d 681, 684-85 (10th Cir. 1977)
(individual employee's solicitation of collective refusal to work held concerted); NLRB v.
Sencore, Inc., 558 F.2d 433, 434 (8th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (individual employee's activity
in enlisting other employees' support for individual views regarding wage increase was for
mutual welfare and was therefore concerted); Randolph Div., Ethan Allen, Inc. v. NLRB,
513 F.2d 706, 708 (lst Cir. 1975) (individual's pro-union statements to management deemed
concerted because employee had welfare of other workers in mind); NLRB v. C & I Air
Conditioning, Inc., 486 F.2d 977, 978 (9th Cir. 1973) (recognizing Interboro principle, see infia
notes 67-76 and accompanying text, but refusing to apply it where individuals complained of
safety on jobsite); NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 388 F.2d 495, 499-500 (2d Cir. 1967)
(individual employee's attempt to enforce collective bargaining agreement found concerted
despite absence of other employees' interest therein); NLRB v. Guernsey-Muskingum Elec.
Co-op., Inc., 285 F.2d 8, 12 (6th Cir. 1960) (individual action may be concerted action where
individual is acting on behalf of, or as a representative of, other employees).
48 Aro, Inc. v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 713, 717 (6th Cir. 1979).
49 See, e.g., Blaw-Knox Foundry & Mill Mach., Inc. v. NLRB, 646 F.2d 113, 116 (4th
Cir. 1981) (no protected concerted activity where individual employee did not act on behalf
of a group); Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel v. NLRB, 618 F.2d 1009, 1017 (3d Cir. 1980) (where
employees act as "spokesmen for the safety of all the employees," activity is protected); Peton
Casteel, Inc. v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 23, 31 n. 16 (7th Cir. 1980); Aro, Inc. v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 713,
717 (6th Cir. 1979); Hugh H. Wilson Corp. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 1345, 1355 (3d Cir. 1969)
(individual employee presenting grievances on behalf of others is protected), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 935 (1970); Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. NLRB, 358 F.2d 411, 413 (9th Cir. 1966) (where
employee complained about working conditions, but was not actually exposed to them him-
self, individual was nevertheless "sympathetic" to the other workers and acted on their be-
half). Because it is closely tied to group activity, some courts may not even consider such
activity individual. 'See injfa note 55 and accompanying text.
50 Pelton Casteel, Inc. v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 23, 31 n.16 (7th Cir. 1980); Hugh H. Wilson
Corp. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 1345, 1355 (3d Cir. 1969) ("[A] spokesman may be a voluntary one
or a chosen representative'), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 935 (1970); NLRB v. Guernsey-Muskingum
Elec. Co-op., Inc. 285 F.2d 8, 12 (6th Cir. 1960) ("The mere fact that the men did not for-
mally choose a spokesman or that they did not go together to see [their employer] does not
negative concert of action.').
51 See Hugh H. Wilson Corp. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 1345, 1349 (3d Cir. 1969) ("The cohe-
siveness of the concerted activity need not be more than the suggestion of group action."), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 935 (1970); Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. NLRB, 358 F.2d 411, 413-14 (9th Cir.
1966); NLRB v. Guernsey-Muskingum Elec. Co-op., Inc., 285 F.2d 8, 12 (6th Cir. 1960). One
employee speaking on behalf of himself and only one other is sufficient to meet this standard.
See Jim Causley Pontiac v. NLRB, 620 F.2d 122 (6th Cir. 1980). The Eighth Circuit has held
that when one employee constitutes an entire bargaining unit, the employee's actions in reli-
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lone employee acting unilaterally for an unwitting and complacent
group of coworkers fails to meet this standard; individual action for the
possible or "theoretical" benefit of others is insufficient. 52
Thus, under the "representation" standard, an individual engages
in concerted activity when he files a safety complaint with the coopera-
tion and consent of another employee, 53 or when he presents a grievance
that a group of employees has discussed and shares.54 Although labeled
"individual," such activity necessarily involves more than one employee
and a matter of common concern; protecting it as concerted merely rec-
ognizes that a group spokesman is an arm of the group.55
B. The Mushroom Standard
In Mushroom Transportation Co. v. NLRB, 5 6 the Third Circuit held
that individual activity is concerted when the activity induces or
prepares for group action to correct a grievance or complaint.57 When
inducement of group action is only a chance consequence or mere possi-
bility, however, the activity fails to meet this standard; the individual
activity must be "intended" or calculated to induce group activity.58
ance on a collective bargaining agreement are protected concerted activity. See NLRB v.
Century Broadcasting Corp., 419 F.2d 771, 780 (8th Cir. 1969).
52 Aro, Inc. v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 713, 717 (6th Cir. 1979). An individual must, in fact, be
acting on behalf of a group. Id "[A]n employee must show either explicit concert of action
or activity on the part of other similarly situated employees which demonstrates tacit ap-
proval of the individual complainant's actions." Note, Sixth Circuit Spurns Interboro, supra
note 24, at 1055.
53 See, e.g., Jim Causley Pontiac v. NLRB, 620 F.2d 122, 123 (6th Cir. 1980) (before
sending letter of. complaint to state health department, individual employee obtained co-
worker's permission to use coworker's name in the letter).
54 See, e.g., Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. NLRB, 358 F.2d 411, 413-14 (9th Cir. 1966).
55 Activity that meets the "representation standard" satisfies the "mutual aid" require-
ment of § 7. By acting as a representative of or acting on behalf of fellow employees, an
individual employee clearly "safeguard[s] not only [his] interest, but also the interests of the
entire bargaining unit. . . ." NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 260 (1975); see
supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
56 330 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1964). In Mushroom, the Third Circuit faced the issue of
whether conversations between employees could constitute concerted activity. See id at 684-
85.
57 Id at 685. The court stated:
[A] conversation may constitute a concerted activity although it involves only
a speaker and a listener, but to qualify as such, it must appear at the very
least that it was engaged in with the object of initiating or inducing or preparing for
group action or that it had some relation to group action in the interest of the employees.
Id (emphasis added); see Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n v. NLRB, 207 F.2d 325, 328
(9th Cir. 1953) ("Concerted activity may take place where one person is seeking to induce
action from a group.") (citing NLRB v. Schwartz, 146 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1945)). Cases like
Indiana Gear Works v. NLRB, 371 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1967) have held that Aushroom protects
individual activity, although not necessarily conversation, aimed at group action. This stan-
dard clearly goes beyond the strict definition of "concert," see supra note 7; the activity pre-
cedes subjective accord between employees. Individual activity protected under the Mushroom
standard, however, is intended to cause such accord.
58 "[G]roup action" should be "intended, contemplated, or. . . referred to." 330 F.2d
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Under the Mushroom standard, courts will protect as concerted ac-
tivity an individual's solicitation of a collective refusal to work on cer-
tain days,59 or an individual's circulation of a petition or leaflet to enlist
the support of other employees in correcting a problem with working
conditions or terms of employment. 60 Conversely, an employee who
presses individual demands for holiday pay to which he deems himself
entitled,6 1 or an employee who walks off the job to protest an individual
work assignment, 62 is not protected, even though his activity affects
other employees.
The rationale of the Mushroom standard is straightforward. Deny-
ing protection to the individual activity meeting this standard would
hamper section 7's protection of concerted activities:63 individual activ-
ity inducing group action is an indispensable step preliminary to actual
group activity.64 Furthermore, as the Mushroom court stressed, a con-
scious purpose to move a group to action is a reliable indication that the
at 685. Even if intended to induce group activity, individual activity may not be protected if
it occurs during working hours and disrupts the work force. See Midland Frame Div., Mid-
land Ross Corp., 216 N.L.R.B. 302 (1975); supra note 24.
59 See, e.g., NLRB v. Empire Gas, Inc., 566 F.2d 681, 684 (10th Cir. 1977) (employee's
writing and sending letter to fellow employees urging them to refrain from pumping gas on
certan day was protected).
60 See, e.g., Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 544 F.2d 320, 327 (7th Cir. 1976) (dis-
tributing of leaflet publicizing allegations of unsatisfactory supervisory instruction and urging
employees to act was protected); Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp. v. NLRB, 407 F.2d 1357,
1365 (4th Cir. 1969) (petition); Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n v. NLRB, 206 F.2d 325,
328 (9th Cir. 1953) (employee's circulation of petition authorizing him to act on behalf of
fellow employees with regard to back pay and overtime wages was protected).
61 See NLRB v. Northern Metal Co., 440 F.2d 881, 884-85 (3d Cir. 1971) (although
benefit to other employees possible, and individual's actions could have caused group action,
individual intended to benefit only himself).
62 See Ontario Knife Co. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 840, 841-42 (2d Cir. 1980) (although pro-
testing her whole shift's work assignment, employee's walking off the job was an individual
response to a perceived inequity and she encouraged no other employees to join her).
63 "[C]ollective activities would surely be hampered if. . .individual efforts looking to
group action were not protected." NLRB v. Empire Gas, Inc., 566 F.2d 681, 684 (10th Cir.
1977). For this reason, the Mushroom standard does not require that individual actions
achieve "fruition" as group activity:
[I]nasmuch as almost any concerted activity for mutual aid and protection
has to start with some kind of communication between individuals, it would
come very near to nullifying the rights of organization and collective bargain-
ing guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act if such communications are denied
protection because of lack of fruition.
330 F.2d at 685.
64 "The.activity of a single employee in enlisting the support of his fellow employees for
their mutual aid and protection is as much 'concerted activity' as is ordinary group activity.
The one seldom exists without the other." Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp. v. NLRB, 407
F.2d 1357, 1365 (4th Cir. 1969); see also NLRB v. Sencore, Inc., 558 F.2d 433, 434 (8th Cir.
1977) (per curiam) ("Higher wages are a frequent objective of organizational activity and
discussions about wages are necessary to further that goal.") (citation omitted); cf. Steere
Dairy, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 1350, 1351 (1978) (individual employee's walkout in protest of
working conditions protected despite fellow employees' refusal to join him; his attempt to
convince fellow employees was a "threshold action to induce group action').
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individual action is more than "mere 'griping.' ",65 The Mushroom stan-
dard enjoys virtually complete judicial acceptance; ten of twelve circuits
have relied on or followed the standard.66
C. The Interboro Doctrine
The controversial Interboro doctrine67 protects individual activity
aimed at enforcing an existing collective bargaining agreement. This
protection extends to situations in which other employees do not know
of or are not interested in the activity, as well as to situations in which
65 330 F.2d at 685. Thus, individual activity "inducing or preparing for group action"
satisfies § 7's "mutual aid" requirement: a conscious purpose to move a group to action is a
strong indicium of a purpose to benefit employees other than the individual employee in-
volved. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. One commentator suggests that the dis-
tinction between individual griping and individual action designed to induce group action is
a "fine line" to draw. See Note, Protected Employee Activity Under Section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act, 1973 WASH. U. L.Q. 931, 938.
66 See Scooba Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 694 F.2d 82, 84 (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (individ-
ual employee "must be engaging in the activity with the object of initiating, inducing or
preparing for group action); Ontario Knife Co. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 840, 845 (2d Cir. 1980)
("Individual activity can be protected. . . if it is 'looking toward group action.' ") (quoting
Mushroom); Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 618 F.2d 1009, 1017 (3d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1078 (1981); Aro, Inc. v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 713, 718 (6th Cir. 1979);
NLRB v. Empire Gas, Inc., 566 F.2d 681, 684 (10th Cir. 1977) (solicitation of collective re-
fusal to work held protected); NLRB v. Sencore, Inc., 558 F.2d 433, 434 (8th Cir. 1977) (per
curiam) (employee's activity in enlisting fellow employees' support regarding wage increase
was for employees' "mutual welfare"); Randolph Div., Ethan Allen, Inc. v. NLRB, 513 F.2d
706, 708 (1st Cir. 1975) (employee's conversations conveying pro-union sentiments found to
be preparation for group action); NLRB v. Buddies Supermarkets, Inc., 481 F.2d 714, 720
(5th Cir. 1973) (Mushroom standard not met because "no substantial evidence that the purpose
of [the employee's] conversations was to arouse concerted action"); Owens-Corning Fiberglas
Corp. v. NLRB, 407 F.2d 1357, 1365 (4th Cir. 1969) (petition regarding working conditions
"was plainly intended to enlist the support and assistance of other employees"); Indiana Gear
Works v. NLRB, 371 F.2d 273, 276 (7th Cir. 1967) ("[T]o prove a concerted activity under
Section 7. . . , it is necessary to demonstrate that the activity was for the purpose of inducing
or preparing for group action to correct a grievance or a complaint.'); Salt River Valley
Water Users' Ass'n v. NLRB, 206 F.2d 325, 328 (9th Cir. 1953) (precedent for Mushroom
standard; concerted activity occurs where individual seeks "to induce action from a group').
67 The standard arose from broad dictum in NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 388
F.2d 495, (2d Cir. 1967):
Even if it were true that [the employee] was acting for his personal benefit, it
is doubtful that a selfish motive negates the protection that the Act normally
gives to Section 7 rights ...
Furthermore, while interest on the part of fellow employees would indi-
cate a concertedpurpose, activities involving attempts to enforce the provisions
of a collective bargaining agreement may be deemed to be for concertedpurposes
even in the absence of such interest by fellow employees. ,
Id. at 499-500 (emphasis added). Interboro involved an employee's complaints on behalf of
other employees about contract violations. The testimony of fellow employees disclosed that
"on several occasions" the discharged employee "was speaking for [the fellow employees] as
well as for himself." See id Because other employees knew abiut and had indicated "interest"
in the individual's complaints, the individual's activity was protected concerted activity. Id
at 500.
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the individual employee does not intend to cause group action.68 Al-
though the individual must base his activity on a reasonable interpreta-
tion of the agreement, 69 his motives may be purely selfish. 70 Thus, the
Interboro doctrine has protected, as concerted activity, individual com-
plaints about jobsite violations of agreement safety standards71 and indi-
vidual protests of denial of seniority rights guaranteed by agreement. 72
The Znterboro doctrine's rationale is that "individual action seeking
to implement the terms of a collective bargaining agreement is merely
an extension of the concerted activity which gave rise to the agreement
in the first place.' 73 Rights secured by agreement are collective rights,
even though personal to each employee. 74 Therefore, an employee who
68 388 F.2d at 500. Interboro protects individual complaints made directly to manage-
ment and which, therefore, could not be intended to induce group action. See infa notes 71-
72 and accompanying text. This protection must be distinguished from protection of such
complaints under the "representation" standard. See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying
text. Under the "representation" standard, such complaints result from group action; an
individual employee complains directly to management because he is the chosen representa-
tive of the employees. See Hugh H. Wilson Corp. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 1345, 1355 (3d Cir.
1969) (right of individual employee to present grievances to management on behalf of other
employees is protected), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 935 (1970).
69 The Second Circuit recognized this limitation in NLRB v. John Langenbacher Co.,
398 F.2d 459, 463 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1049 (1969) ("[A]n attempt by employ-
ees to enforce their understanding of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement is a pro-
tected activity . . . if the employees have a reasonable basis for believing that their
understanding of the terms was the understanding that had been agreed upon .. 2) (cita-
tions omitted) (emphasis added). The NLRB has used Interboro to justify extending protection
to an employee's complaint when it has only a "colorable" basis in the collective bargaining
agreement. See Aro, Inc. v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 713, 717 (6th Cir. 1979) (citing Snap-On Tools
Corp., 207 N.L.R.B. 238 (1973)). The collective bargaining agreement need not be written; it
may be an oral agreement or merely a "relationship." See NLRB v. Ben Pekin Corp., 452
F.2d 205, 206 (7th Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (although written collective bargaining agreement
was lacking, because employee "thought that he and his fellow employees were entitled to [a
wage] increase" because of "relationship" and "oral agreement," his actions were protected).
70 One commentator suggests that the "reasonable interpretation" requirement ensures
that Interboro does not protect individual gripes or complaints. See Note, Constructive Concerted
Activit, supra note 8, at 159. This assertion is a non sequitur. Interboro protects an individual
gripe or complaint when the individual reasonably bases it on the collective bargaining agree-
ment. See in/a notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
71 See, e.g., City Disposal Systems, 256 N.L.R.B. 73 (1981) (relying on Interboro, NLRB
finds unlawful discharge where individual employee refused to operate allegedly unsafe
equipment); NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 388 F.2d 495, 497-500 (2d Cir. 1967); see
also Illinois Ruan Transp. Corp. v. NLRB, 404 F.2d 274, 285 (8th Cir. 1968) (Lay, J., dissent-
ing) (majority finds unauthorized use of employer's equipment in violation of contract not
protected activity; dissent argues that discharged employee acted "in implementation of the
collective-bargaining agreement, which amounted to an extension of the concerted activity
that gave rise to that agreement") (citing Interhoro).
72 See NLRB v. Selwyn Shoe Mfg. Corp., 428 F.2d 217, 219-21 (8th Cir. 1970).
73 Aro, Inc. v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 713, 716 (6th Cir. 1979). In Keokuk Gas Serv. Co. v.
NLRB, 580 F.2d 328, 333 (8th Cir. 1978), the court protected an individual's threat to use a
grievance procedure pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement "'because the collective
bargaining agreement is the result of concerted activities by the employees for their mutual
aid and protection' " (quoting Seloyn Shoe, 428 F.2d at 221).
74 Rights under the collective bargaining agreement are personal because individual
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enforces such rights acts on behalf of the group as an extension of the
original concert: he effectuates the expressed will of the group. .Further-
more, vindication of a collective bargaining agreement's terms presuma-
bly ensures that the individual activity satisfies section 's "mutual aid"
requirement 5 Of course, individual activity outside the context of a
collective bargaining agreement is outside of the doctrine's protection.76
The Interboro doctrine has been controversial. Although the NLRB
has applied the Interboro doctrine for many years,77 only a few circuits
have embraced it, and no others appear willing to follow their lead.78
employees initiate the contract grievance mechanisms and, therefore, the agreement theoreti-
cally constitutes a personal contract between the employer and each employee. See Selwyn
Shoe, 428 F.2d at 221.
75 "[R]ights secured by such an agreement, though personal to each employee, are pro-
tected rights under § 7 of the Act because the collective bargaining agreement is the result of
concerted activities by the employees for their mutual aid and protection." Id; see infra notes
79-83 and accompanying text.
76 See Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp. v NLRB, 635 F.2d 304, 309 (4th Cir. 1980) (In-
terboro inapplicable "since there is no collective bargaining agreement and, therefore, no foun-
dation for a finding of 'constructive concerted activity' under the rationale adopted in
Interboro'); NLRB v. Dawson Cabinet Co., 566 F.2d 1079, 1083 (8th Cir. 1977) (individual
employee's refusal to work unprotected where "the employees are not unionized and no col-
lective bargaining agreement is in effect"; Interboro inapplicable); NLRB v. Buddies Super-
markets, Inc., 481 F.2d 714, 719 (5th Cir. 1973) (Interboro inapplicable because individual
employee's activity "did not arise in the framework of an attempt to enforce an existing col-
lective bargaining agreement"). Outside the context of collective bargaining agreements, the
Second Circuit, the originator of the Interboro doctrine, interprets individual concerted activity
restrictively. In Ontario Knife Co. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 840, 845 (2d Cir. 1980), the Second
Circuit concluded:
We think that, except in the context of agreements between an employer
and his employees which are themselves the product of concerted activities, as
in Interboro § 7,. . . should be read according to its terms. Not only must the
ultimate objective be "mutual" but the activity must be "concerted" or, if
taken by an individual as in Weingarten, must be looking toward group action.
Cf supra note 23 (distinguishing the "mutual aid" and "concerted activity" requirements).
77 See, e.g., Searle Auto Glass, Inc., 264 N.L.R.B. 169 (1982); Key City Mechanical Con-
tractors, Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. 1884 (1977); Bunney Bros. Constr. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 1516, 1519
(1962). See generally Note, Constructive Concerted Activity, supra note 8, at 156; Note, Sixth Circuit
Spums Interboro, supra note 24, at 1059 n.52.
78 The Second Circuit originated the Interboro doctrine and adheres to it, although in
Ontario Knife Co. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 840, 845 (2d Cir. 1980), it recognized the doctrine's
"mixed reception" and rejected the Board's reliance on Interboro. The court limited Interboro's
applicability to situations in which a collective bargaining agreement exists. See supra notes
68-76.
The Seventh Circuit applied the doctrine in NLRB v. Ben Pekin Corp., 452 F.2d 205,
206 (7th Cir. 1971), but may have since changed its position. See NLRB v. Slotkowski Sau-
sage Co., 620 F.2d 642, 647 (7th Cir. 1980) (noting NLRB's reliance on Ben Pekin, but denying
enforcement of NLRB order and finding individual engaged in "chronic complaining," not
protected concerted activity). The First Circuit has relied on Interboro only for the proposition
that "[t]he requirement of concertedness relates to the end, not the means." Randolph Div.,
Ethan Allen, Inc. v. NLRB, 513 F.2d 706, 708 (lst Cir. 1975); see infia notes 79-83 and accom-
panying text.
The Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have rejected the Interboro doctrine as an
unwarranted expansion of § 7. See Royal Dev. Co. v. NLRB, No. 81-7638 (9th Cir. Feb. 22,
1983); Aro, Inc. v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 713, 717 (6th Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Buddies Supermarkets,
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Furthermore, Interboro's broad dictum 79 has resulted in courts misinter-
preting the doctrine. Some courts interpret Interboro to support the prop-
osition that "[t]he requirement of concertedness relates to the end, not
the means"80 or that "an effect on the group suffices to render an action
'concerted' for purpose[s] of section 7."81 These interpretations are in-
Inc., 481 F.2d 714, 719 (5th Cir. 1973); NLRB v. Northern Metal Co., 440 F.2d 881, 884 (3d
Cir. 1971).
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has not yet had to resolve the Interboro
issue. However, it expressed "serious doubts" as to Inerboro's validity in Kohls v. NLRB, 629
F.2d 173, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("[T]he rationale supporting the doctrine is suspect; Interboro
creates a legal fiction of constructive concerted activity in the face of statutory language that
plainly protects workers who 'engage in concerted activity' for the mutual aid and protection
of other workers.") (emphasis in original). Similarly, the Fourth Circuit refused to pass on the
doctrine's validity, but questioned its rationale. See Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp. v. NLRB,
635 F.2d 304, 308-09 (4th Cir. 1980). But see Roadway Express, Inc., 217 N.L.R.B. 278, 279,
enforced men. 532 F.2d 751 (4th Cir. 1976) (employee who acted alone in refusing to work
engaged in protected concerted activity because "the nature of his complaint [had] signifi-
cance and relevance under the contract to the interests of all of [the other] employees"). The
Eighth Circuit found it unnecessary "to pass on the validity of the Interboro rule" in NLRB v.
Dawson Cabinet Co., 566 F.2d 1079, 1083 (8th Cir. 1977); the court, however, quoted exten-
sively from the Northern Metal decision, which rejected the rule. See id
79 See supra note 67. Interboro's dictum providing protection of "concerted purposes" is
especially troublesome. See NLRB v. Northern Metal Co., 440 F.2d 881, 884 (3d Cir. 1971)
("The [NLRA] surely does not mention 'concerted purposes.'") (emphasis in original). This
formulation confuses the "concerted activity" requirement with the "mutual aid" require-
ment. See supra notes 22-46 and accompanying text; infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
80 Randolph Div., Ethan Allen, Inc. v. NLRB, 513 F.2d 706, 708 (Ist Cir. 1975); see
NLRB v. Sencore, Inc., 558 F.2d 433, 434 (8th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (Individual employee's
"complaint was not solely aimed at resolving a personal problem. The welfare of other work-
ers was also in mind. The requirement of concertedness relates to the end, not the means.")
(citing Randolph Division). The assertion that "concerted" is a requirement regarding the
gains to be derived from conduct, rather than the manner of achieving those gains, distorts
the language of § 7. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
81 Anchortank, Inc. v. NLRB, 618 F.2d 1153, 1160 (5th Cir. 1980); see id. at 1161 n.10
("[T]he effects of the employee's action on the group [is] the focus of the Interboro approach.").
The Anchorlank court formulated the issue as "whether the action of a single employee must
involve both a concerted purpose and a concertedect to deserve section 7 protection or whether a
concerted effect alone will suffice." Id at 1160 (emphasis added). The court apparently de-
cided that § 7 requires only "concerted effect": because the object of the employee's action
did "not have the ejfct on other employees essential to satisfaction of the Interboro standard for
concerted activity," the individual's actions were not concerted activity. Id at 1161 (empha-
sis added).
This misinterpretation of the Interboro doctrine, as looking to "effect," led the Anchortank
court to opine that the Supreme Court has adopted the doctrine. The court focused on the
Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975): "In conclud-
ing that an employee engages in concerted activity when he seeks union representation at an
interview which he reasonably fears may lead to discipline, the [Weingarten] Court focused
entirely on the eJects of such representation on the bargaining unit." 618 F.2d at 1161 (cita-
tions omitted) (emphasis added). This analysis of Weingarten is inaccurate. The employee's
request in Weingarten, for union representation "at a confrontation with his employer," 420
U.S. at 260, clearly satisfied § 7's "concerted activity" requirement: the request was an at-
tempt to act in actual concert-to combine for mutual advantage. Indeed, the Anchortank
court admitted that "the employee's activity in Weingarten satisfied the Mushroom standard for
concerted activity. . . by asking for union representation by her collective-bargaining agent,
.. .[thereby] inducing group action." 618 F.2d at 1161 n.10. But cf. id (Weingarten "did not
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consistent with Interboro's rationale because they extend the doctrine be-
yond the context of a collective bargaining agreement. 82 The agreement
is "essential because it is the source of the employee's claimed rights, '8 3
and constitutes the employee's identifiable tie with the expressed will of
all employees.
D. The NLRB "Benefit" Standard
The NLRB's broad standard protects an employee's individual ac-
tivity if it potentially benefits his fellow employees, 84 His fellow employ-
ees need not know of or show an interest in this activity;85 nor does the
standard require either an intention to induce group action or an ex-
isting collective bargaining agreement.8 6 Thus, the standard protects an
individual employee's complaints concerning alleged jobsite safety
hazards or violations. 87 Indeed, it protects any individual action regard-
analyze the issue on those terms, but instead based its conclusions on the effects of the em-
ployee's action on the group, the focus of the Interboro approach"). Thus, the issue in Wein-
garten concerned the "mutual aid," and not the "concerted activity," requirement of§ 7. The
protection of employees "against unwarranted punishment," the purpose of the union repre-
sentative's presence at the disciplinary interview, was "of concern to the entire bargaining
unit." 420 U.S. at 261 n.6 (quoting Comment, Union Presence in Discilinay Meetings, 41 U.
CHI. L. REv. 329, 338 (1974)). This constituted "mutual aid or protection" according to the
Weingarten Court-the "safeguarding [of] not only the particular employee's interest, but also
the interests of the entire bargaining unit." 420 U.S. at 260. Thus, the employee's activity in
Weingarten clearly satisfied both requirements of § 7.
82 See supra notes 73, 76.
83 NLRB v. Bighorn Beverage, 614 F.2d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir. 1980) (refusing to extend
the Interboro doctrine to "situations where there [is] no collective bargaining agreement in-
volved") (citation omitted).
84 This standard originated in Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 999 (1975), in which
an employee complained to the California Occupational Safety and Health Administration
about working conditions in a plant manufacturing carpet cushions. The NLRB protected
the individual's action as concerted because its effect would "benefit" all employees:
"[W]here an employee speaks up and seeks to enforce statutory provisions relating to occupa-
tional safety designed for the benefit of all employees, in the absence of any evidence that
fellow employees disavow such representation, we will find an implied consent thereto and
deem such activity to be concerted." Id at 1000; see infa note 91.
Until the early 1950's, the NLRB and the courts used very similar standards to deter-
mine "concerted activity." See Note, "Concerted" Action, supra note 8, at 520. Today, the
NLRB applies and the courts reject the very permissive "benefit" standard. See infra note 93.
One commentator suggests that a change in the standard of judicial review of NLRB deci-
sions facilitated this divergence. See Note, "Concerted" Action, supra note 8, at 520-21. Today,
"[t]he Board's findngs must be sustained if they are supported by substantial evidence on the
record considered as a whole." Keokuk Gas Serv. Co. v. NLRB, 580 F.2d 328, 334 (8th Cir.
1978) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), () (1970) and Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S.
474 (1951)). The earlier standard of review required only that NLRB findings be "supported
by evidence." 49 Stat. 453, 454 (1935) (previously codified at 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1946)).
85 See Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 999, 1000 (1975).
86 See Bighorn Beverage, 236 N.L.R.B. 736, 752-53 (1978), enforced a modied, 614 F.2d
1238 (9th Cir. 1980). Thus, the "benefit" standard is more permissive than the Interboro doc-
trine, which requires the existence of a collective bargaining agreement. See supra notes 68-75,
76 and accompanying text.
87 See, e.g., Bighorn Beverage, 236 N.L.R.B. 736, 752-53 (1978), enforced as modifed, 614
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ing the terms or conditions of employment.8 8 Nevertheless, the standard
does not protect individual complaining, for such action benefits only
the individual.89
The rationale of this standard rests on the group benefit that alleg-
edly accrues when one employee acts with regard to matters of common
concern. 90 The standard also rests on a presumption that when other
employees fail to disavow an individual's activity, they "implied[ly] con-
sent" 9 1 to the activity; this failure to disavow triggers a "presumption of
group conduct and participation. ' 92 The courts, however, have roundly
rejected the NLRB's "benefit" standard.93
F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1980); Phyllis Whitehead, 224 N.L.R.B. 244 (1976) (employee's presenta-
tion of a list of alleged safety violations to employer protected); Alleluia Cushion Co., 221
N.L.R.B. 999, 1000 (1975) (complaint to state occupational safety and health administration
protected).
88 See Diagnostic Center Hosp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 1215, 1217 (1977) (individual activ-
ity is "concerted in nature if it relates to a matter of common concern"); inJfra note 139 and
accompanying text; cf. Steere Dairy, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 1350, 1351 (1978) (although other
employees refused to join him, individual protest by an employee who was then discharged
was protected, because the protest "involved a group concern-the pay and working condi-
tions of all employees").
89 See, e.g., Hunt Tool Co., 192 N.L.R.B. 145 (1971) (purely personal suit against em-
ployer for on-the-job injury not protected); see supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text. The
Board seems to have overruled Hunt Tool in Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp., 245 N.L.R.B.
1053 (1979), enforcement denied, 635 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1980), when the Board held that the
filing of a workmen's compensation claim is of common interest to other employees who
might want to file such claims in the future. See id at 1053. Thus, the NLRB "benefit"
standard seems to protect mere individual griping and complaining when the Board believes
that the activity might help "employees who might be similarly situated in the future." John-
son, Protected Concerted Activity in the Non-Union Context: Limitations on the Employer's Rights to
Discipline or Discharge Employees, 49 Miss. L.J. 839, 848 (1978).
90 See, e.g., Bighorn Beverage, 236 N.L.R.B. 736, 752-53 (1978) (even though employee
individually complained about carbon monoxide fumes, his activity was protected as con-
certed because safe working conditions are matters of great and continuing concern for the
entire work force), enforced as modifed 614 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1980).
91 Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 999, 1000 (1975). The Board in Alleluia Cushion
held that "[t]he absence of any outward manifestation of support for [the discharged individ-
ual employee's] efforts is not . . . sufficient to establish that [other] employees did not share
[the individual employee's] interest in safety. . . . Safe working conditions are matters of
great and continuing concern for all within the work force." Id; see supra note 84. But see
Comet Fast Freight, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. 40 (1982) wherein the Board refused to uphold an
administrative law judge's finding of unlawful discharge where an employee's complaint in-
volved a safety problem of concern to all employees and none of the employees had dis-
avowed the discharged employee's complaint. The Board distinguished Alleluia Cushion,
construing the admission of the individual employee in Comet-that his fellow workers did not
mind driving the truck in question-as evidence that the other employees "did not share his
concerns, and that the condition of the truck was of moment to [the discharged employee]
alone." Id. at 42.
92 Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp. v. NLRB, 635 F.2d 304, 309 (4th Cir. 1980).
93 The only courts which have considered [the NLRB "benefit" standard] have
flatly rejected any rule that where the complaint of a single employee relates
to an alleged violation of federal or state safety laws and there is no proof of a
purpose enlisting group action in support of the complaint, there is "construc-
tive concerted action" . . ..
Id; see Ontario Knife Co. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 840, 844-45 (2d Cir. 1980) (rejecting NLRB's
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III
FROM "REPRESENTATION" TO "BENEFIT": LIMITING THE
FICTION OF INDIVIDUAL CONCERTED ACTIVITY
Each of the four standards of individual concerted activity fiction-
alizes section 7's "concerted activity" requirement.94 Thus, each pro-
tects activity that the NLRA apparently leaves unprotected.95 The
legitimacy of each standard depends upon whether it effectuates the pol-
icies of the NLRA or merely distorts the language of section 7.
The "representation" standard,96 which protects individual em-
ployees who act "on behalf of, or as a representative of"97 other employ-
ees, is legitimate. It protects activities that are individual in only a very
literal sense: a group spokesman is indeed an arm of the group.98 The
standard, therefore, only minimally fictionalizes the concert require-
ment so central to the foundation of collective bargaining.99 Further-
more, an individual employee acting as a spokesman for his fellow
workers acts on matters of common concern and, therefore, establishes a
"solidarity" that is "'mutual aid' in the most literal sense."100
The Mushroom standard, 0 1 which protects individual activity "en-
gaged in with the object of initiating or inducing or preparing for group
action,"1°2 is also legitimate. Protection of actual group action is a fun-
damental policy of the NLRA.10 3 The Mushroom standard effectuates
reliance on Interboro and Weingarten); Kohls v. NLRB, 629 F.2d 173, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(rejecting NLRB's reliance on Interboro), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 931 (1981); Pelton Casteel, Inc.
v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 23, 30 (7th Cir. 1980) ("proof that other employees shared the concerns
voiced by the discharged employee" insufficient to support finding of concerted activity);
NLRB v. Bighorn Beverage, 614 F.2d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir. 1980) (rejecting NLRB's reliance
on Aleluia Cushion); Aro, Inc. v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 713, 717 (6th Cir. 1979) ("We think [the
NLRB's] expansive reading of the concerted activity clause of § 7 goes too far."); NLRB v.
Dawson Cabinet Co., 566 F.2d 1079, 1083 (8th Cir. 1977) ("We have not been cited to or
found any cases where the Board's extension of the Interboro rule to non-union and non-collec-
tive bargaining situations has been approved.'); NLRB v. Buddies Supermarkets, Inc., 481
F.2d 714, 720 (5th Cir. 1973) (even if the individual employee's activity "might have inured
to the benefit of the other [employees], it is an exceedingly tenuous basis upon which to rest a
finding of concerted activity'); NLRB v. Northern Metal Co., 440 F.2d 881, 884 (3d Cir.
1971) (rejecting NLRB's reliance on Interboro).
94 Because "concerted activities," read literally, appears to require more than a single
participant, 'ee supra notes 7, 41 and accompanying text, any standard granting protection to
individual concerted activity fictionalizes the "concert" requirement. See supra note 8.
95 See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
96 See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text.
97 Aro, Inc. v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 713, 717 (6th Cir. 1979);seesupra notes 48-49 and accom-
panying text.
98 See supra text accompanying note 55.
99 See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
100 United States v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 261 (1974) (quoting NLRB v.
Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., 130 F.2d 503, 506 (2d Cir. 1942)).
101 See supra notes 56-66 and accompanying text.
102 Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964).
103 See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text; infra notes 116-19.
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this policy by protecting the indispensable preliminary step to group
action: individual action intended to induce group action. 104 Both the
"representation" and Mushroom standards, therefore, effectuate legiti-
mate policies, and virtually all courts accept one' 0 5 or both of them.
10 6
In contrast, most courts have refused to adopt the Inlerboro doc-
trine 10 7 and virtually all courts have rejected the NLRB "benefit" stan-
dard.108 Commentators have criticized the courts for their failure to
provide greater protection for individual or "constructive concerted ac-
tivity."' 1 9 Professors Gorman and Finkin argue "that all work-related
claims of individual employees should be treated as within the scope of
the term 'concerted activities' in section 7 of the NLRA."u 0 Although
they admit that the doctrine of "constructive concerted activity" rests
"upon an accumulation of fictions and fabricated presumptions""' and
that the doctrine "may run into difficulty with the language of section
7... .,112 they champion the idea that "industrial democracy ' 113-
concern for the "liberty and dignity of the individual working per-
104 Se supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
105 See supra notes 49, 66.
106 The Sixth Circuit recently declared that if an individual employee "actually proceeds
on behalf of other employees, or at least with the intent to induce group action, in the presen-
tation of work-related grievances arguably based within the collective bargaining agreement,
then the activity is protected by the Act." McLean Trucking Co. v. NLRB, 689 F.2d 605, 608
(6th Cir. 1982). The McLean court, in evaluating the nature of the individual employee's
action, found the following factors relevant to the issue of concertedness:
(1) the substance of the employee's activity--did he act alone, without union
advice or did he seek to involve and inform other employees; (2) the degree of
union involvement in and concern with the dispute-was a grievance filed,
were union officials notified; (3) the subject of the complaint-did it have at
least an arguable basis in the collective bargaining agreement or was it merely
a personal dispute.
Id at 609; see also Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp. v. NLRB, 635 F.2d 304, 306-07 (4th Cir.
1980) (individual's activity protected when "the action looks to group rather than mere indi-
vidual action, and includes 'some element of collective activity or contemplation thereof,' or it
is shown 'that the individual in fact was acting on behalf of, or as a representative of, other
employees.' ") (footnote omitted); Aro, Inc. v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 713, 718 (6th Cir. 1979) (to be
protected, complaint "must be made on behalf of other employees or at least be made with
the object of inducing or preparing for group action").
107 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
108 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
109 Gorman & Finkin, The Individual and the Requirement of "Concert" Under the National Labor
Relations Act, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 286, 309 (1981).
110 Id (emphasis added).
111 Id
112 Id at 299.
By defining concerted activity as conduct, even by an individual, which has
some general improvement in working conditions as its purpose, the Board
has in effect read out of section 7 the apparent requirement that themeans be
somehow concerted. It has substituted the independent requirement of con-
certed benefits for that of concerted activity, creating a redundancy in the
Act.
Id (emphasis in original)
113 Id at 339. Gorman and Finkin admit that the idea of" 'industrial democracy' may
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son"' 4 -underlies the NLRA, particularly section 7.
Although the drafters of the NLRA" 15 and its predecessors' 16 recog-
nized freedom of the individual worker as a dominant concern, Gorman
and Finkin virtually ignore the most important aspect of federal policy
underlying the NLRA-the preservation of "the institution of collective
bargaining and the achievement of industrial stability."' '7 The rights
accorded employees under the NLRA were intended "to write equity
into the law, to make the relationship between labor and management
equitable, [and] to place them on an equal basis."' 18 Granting limitless
sound like a shibboleth" but assert that the idea was of utmost importance to the drafters of
the NLRA. See id
114 d* at 344.
115 The drafters of the NLRA adopted, in §§ 7 and 8(1), the language of § 2 of the Nor-
ris-LaGuardia Act. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text. Professors Gorman and
Finkin admit that the NLRA "was focused principally upon the protection of group action
for the purpose of improving wages and working conditions." Gorman & Finkin, supra note
109, at 338. They argue, however, that such focus upon group action does not mandate a
"less favored status for individual activity having the same objective." Id (emphasis in origi-
.nal). Therefore, because Congress did not contemplate such a "less favored status" for indi-
vidual workers, individual activity ipso facto deserves more generous protection than courts
currently grant.
116 Section 6 of the Clayton Act states that "[t]he labor of a human being is not a com-
modity or article of commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976). Section 2 of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act provides:
Whereas under prevailing economic conditions, developed with the aid of
governmental authority for owners of property to organize in the corporate
and other forms of ownership association, the individual unorganized worker
is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect his
freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable terms and conditions of
employment, wherefore, though he should be free to decline to associate with
his fellows, it is necessary that he have full freedom of association, self-organi-
zation, and designation of representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate
the terms and conditions of his employment, and that he shall be free from
the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in
the designation of such representatives or in self-organization or in other con-
certed activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection ....
29 U.S.C. § 102 (1976). Professors Gorman and Finkin emphasize the "helpless[ness]" of the
"individual unorganized worker" and his various freedoms----"freedom of labor," "freedom of
association," and freedom "from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers."
Gorman & Finkin, supra note 109, at 335. The granting of these freedoms must be viewed,
however, in connection with what Congress was attempting to counterbalance-the great
disparity in bargaining power between "corporate and other forms of ownership association"
and employees due to "prevailing economic conditions." The NLRA drafters knew that true
equality of bargaining power could be realized only by expanding statutory protection of
group activity. As the Second Circuit stated shortly after the passage of the NLRA: "[B]y
extending the number of those who will make the enemy of one the enemy of all, the power of
each is vastly increased." NLRB v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., 130 F.2d 503,
506 (2d Cir. 1942); cf. supra note 44 and accompanying text.
117 Gorman &Finkin,supra note 109, at 338 (emphasis added); see supra notes 40-46, 106
and accompanying text; infia notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
118 93 CONG. REc. 3425 (1947) (remarks of Rep. Hartley), reprintedin I NLRB, LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF THE. LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 617 (1948). The
Supreme Court, in Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964), affirms that the
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protection to an individual employee's actions distorts the language of
section 7, violates the policies of the NLRA, reestablishes inequity in the
labor-management relationship, and thus facilitates industrial strife."19
A closer examination of the Interboro doctrine and the NLRB "benefit"
standard reveals this distortion and resulting inequity.
Lacking requirements of active concert 120 and subjective accord
among fellow employees,12 1 the Interboro doctrine completely ignores the
"concerted activity" requirement. The doctrine lacks even the Mushroom
standard's saving grace of validating an indispensable step prior to con-
cert: the incitement of group action. The doctrine emasculates the con-
cert requirement by allowing it to be satisfied by the existence of a
collective bargaining agreement, the same condition that satisfies the
"mutual aid" requirement. 122 In short, the doctrine protects activity
meeting only a single indicium of merit-mutual aid12 3-and bases sat-
isfaction of the mutual aid requirement on the kind of theoretical bene-
fit rejected under other standards. 124
By effectively eliminating a separate concert requirement, the In-
terboro doctrine allows section 7's catch-all provision-"concerted activi-
ties for mutual aid or protection"-to operate far beyond the
parameters of the other section 7 activities.125 Protection depends solely
NLRA was intended to promote industrial stability by encouraging the establishment of col-
lective bargaining.
119 See infira notes 125-31 and accompanying text. Professors Gorman and Finkin ac-
knowledge that "[e]mployers might be inclined to believe that [their] proposed interpretation
will significantly undermine plant discipline and productivity. . . coddle the incurably in-
subordinate. . . [and] undermine the status of the union and the integrity of the grievance
procedures of the contract . . . ." Gorman & Finkin, supra note 109, at 353.
120 See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
121 See Note, "'Concerted" Action, supra note 8, at 520. Conceivably, Interboro protects indi-
vidual activity that the employees as a whole would disavow. Such protection is unwarranted
and improper under a statutory scheme protecting "concerted activities." See supra notes 41-
46 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the philosophy of the NLRA, especially § 7, is that
employees have the right to be represented by a bargaining agent or other such representative
of their choice. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157 (1976);seealo Clark's Gamble Corp. v. NLRB, 422
F.2d 845 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 868 (1970); NLRB v. Red Arrow Freight Lines, Inc.,
180 F.2d 585, 586 (5th Cir. 1950) (§ 7's "apparent purpose" is "to permit employees. . . to
choose their own bargaining agent"). An individual employee may also choose to refrain
from being represented by a labor union or other bargaining agent. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
If courts protect individual conduct that other employees neither knew of nor consented to,
the other employees' right of choice undet the NLRA may be diluted.
122 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
123 See supra note 75; supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
124 See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
125 See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text. But see Dolin, The Interboro Doctrine and
the Courts: A Histoy ofjudicalPronouncements on the Protected Staus ofl ndividualAssertions of Collec-
tive Rights, 31 AM. U.L. REv. 551 (1982). Dolin argues that Interboro is a "sound, reasonable
doctrine that, as a product of the NLRB's exclusive expertise in labor relations matters, ought
to be respected by the federal courts." Id at 590. In support of her interpretation of § 7,
Dolin relies on § 9(a) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §'159(a) (1976). Section 9(a) provides, in
pertinent part, that "[r]epresentatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective
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on the easily satisfied mutual aid requirement.' 26 The doctrine thus can
foster after-the-fact rationalization of mere individual complaining
whenever a collective bargaining agreement is extant.'
27
Besides ignoring section 7, the availability of such after-the-fact ra-
tionalization may derogate established grievance procedures: if an indi-
vidual employee can base his actions on the collective bargaining
agreement, he may bypass the grievance procedure without fear of em-
ployer retaliation. Derogation of established grievance procedures
strains the entire collective bargaining system.' 28 Furthermore, when in-
dividuals have complaints that they know the system will not redress
because the complaints are either de minimis or without merit, the In-
terboro doctrine provides an effective means for disgruntled individuals
to harass employers.' 29
Because the Interboro doctrine protects individual complaints based
on a collective bargaining agreement, 30 it forces employers to take such
complaints as seriously as collective bargaining and other organizational
activities by employees. The Interboro doctrine thus equates individual
bargaining with collective bargaining, which goes far beyond the
bargaining. . . shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit. .. "
Specifically, Dolin interprets the proviso to § 9(a) as "protect[ing] the employee's limited
right to present individual grievances directly to the employer. . . ." Dolin, supra at 561.
Dolin is correct insofar as "Congress intended to '[assure] the individual grievant the right to
confer with his employer without participation of the certified bargaining agent.'" Id at 563.
This intent does not support her conclusion, however, that "Congress sought to vest employ-
ees with an affirmative right at least as broad as that conferred by Interbaro." Id
126 See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
127 Interboro protects an individual if he can, in any way, base his actions on a collective
bargaining agreement. Activity engaged in solely by, and on behalf of, an individual can
become protected if he argues convincingly that he sought to vindicate the agreement. See
supra note 75 and accompanying text. Requiring an actual tie to real group activity screens
out the more blatantly personal complaints. See supra notes 32-36, 39 and accompanying text.
128 See Note, Constructive Concerted Activity, supra note 8, at 173. When individuals circum-
vent the process too frequently, both employees and employers no longer accept the process as
the most efficacious means of settling disputes. See McLean Trucking Co. v. NLRB, 689 F.2d
605, (6th Cir. 1982). In setting forth factors relevant to the issue of concertedness the McLean
court was concerned about the "degree of union involvement in and concern with the dis-
pute-was a grievance filed, were union officials notified. . . ." Id. at 609. Presumably, once
the parties establish a grievance procedure, courts will be more willing to declare "concerted"
the actions of individual employees who utilize that procedure. The efficacy of the collective
bargaining process is, therefore, maintained. But see Note, supra note 27, at 993 (protecting
individual activity when it relates to terms and conditions of employment "does not under-
mine unionism").
129 Chaos would result if every disenchanted employee, every disturbed em-
ployee, and every employee who harbored a dislike for his employer, could
harass both the union and the employer by processing grievances through the
various steps of the grievance procedure and ultimately by bringing an action
to compel arbitration in the face of clear contractual provisions intended to
channel the enforcement remedy through the union.
Black-Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 313 F.2d 179, 186 (2d Cir. 1962).
130 See Note, supra note 27, at 1014.
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NLRA's purpose of reducing the "inequality of bargaining power"' 3 t
between employer and employees.
The NLRB "benefit" standard, 132 which protects an employee's in-
dividual activity if it potentially benefits his fellow employees, 33 is
clearly unacceptable; like the Interboro doctrine it ignores the language of
section 7 and related sections of the NLRA. The standard bases its pro-
tection of individual activity on a finding of benefit akin to the "mutual
aid" requirement.' 34 It effectively excises "concerted actitivies" from
section 7, for according to the NLRB, fulfillment of the "mutual aid"
requirement fulfills the "concerted activity" requirement. 135 This at-
tempted merging of section 7's two requirements is simply too "tenu-
ous"' 36 to accept. Furthermore, a finding of concerted activity is a
"jurisdictional requirement"1 37 for NLRB action. As the Fourth Circuit
stated: "[i]t would be odd, indeed, if this essential quasi-jurisdiction
predicate might be supplied by a presumption admittedly resting on no
factual base but predicated on a purely theoretical assumption."' 3 8 In
short, the "benefit" standard extends protection of individual conduct
beyond the principled limit of section 7.139
131 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976); see supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
132 See supra notes 84-93 and accompanying text.
133 See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
134 The NLRB reasons that when an individual acts on matters of concern common to
fellow employees, he is ipsofacto engaged in concerted activity that "benefits" them. See supra
notes 88-92 and accompanying text. The "safeguarding [of] not only the particular em-
ployee's interest, but also the interests of the entire bargaining unit" fulfills the "mutual aid"
requirement of § 7. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 260 (1961); see supra notes 28-
31 and accompanying text.
135 See supra notes 88-92, 134 and accompanying text.
136 "Even if [the employee's] success. . . might have inured to the benefit of the other
[employees], it is an exceedingly tenuous basis upon which to rest a findng of concerted activ-
ity." NLRB v. Buddies Supermarkets, Inc., 481 F.2d 714, 720 (5th Cir. 1973).
137 Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp. v. NLRB, 635 F.2d 304, 310 (4th Cir. 1980).
138 Id The "quasi-jurisdiction[al]" character of the "concerted activities" requirement is
evident. Section 10(a) of the NLRA empowers the Board "to prevent any person from engag-
ing in any unfair labor practice. . . listed in section [8]." 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976). Section
8(a)(1) makes employer interference with employees' § 7 rights--the right to engage in "con-
certed activities"--,unlawful. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976). The NLRB thus has no jurisdic-
tion until an employer violates § 8, which he does not violate until he interferes with
protected "concerted activities."
The Krispy Kreme court also examined the effect of the Board's "presumption of group
conduct and participation," 635 F.2d at 309, see supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text, on
the burden of proof:
[T]he Board confesses in its brief. . . that [in] no proceeding in which it has
proposed this theory has the Board suggested "the precise manner whereby an
employer might obtain evidence to rebut the presumption" that other em-
ployees identified with the complaint. It follows, therefore, that the Board
would set up a presumption which in practical effect. . . would be impossible
for an employer to rebut and thus would constitute an irrebutable
presumption.
635 F.2d at 309.
139 The Fifth Circuit, in NLRB v. Datapoint Corp., 642 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1981) agreed:
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CONCLUSION
Congress enacted section 7 of the NLRA to redress the inequality of
employer-employee bargaining power. The courts and the NLRB
should construct the fiction of individual concerted activity to effectuate
this congressional purpose; they should not use it as a means of reversing
employer-employee inequality in the employees' favor. Actual concert
is a reliable indication that employees are, in fact, acting for mutual aid
and not merely for personal benefit. The explicit requirement of "con-
certed activities" should not be interpreted so loosely as to destroy sec-
tion 7's purpose.
Rita Gail Smith and Richard A. Parr II
The Board asks us to set too far-reaching a precedent, one by which virtually
any action taken by a single employee in any way related to wages, hours or
the terms and conditions of employment would be considered protected con-
certed activity. If Congress had intended Section 7 to be read so broadly, it
certainly could have done so with much more definite language, and courts
would have discovered that intent long ago.
Id at 129.
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